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Abstract 
Drawing largely on already published literature, the article examines the hypothesis, 
derived from Frank, that the current proliferation of first person accounts of grief 
represents an attempt by mourners to recover their voice in the face of grief’s 
medicalisation. The extent of medicine’s colonisation of grief is found to be limited. 
Though some mourners make a point of rejecting semi-psychiatric terms, others use 
such terms to structure their accounts of grief. A broader analysis shows that the 
policing of grief often occurs without reference to medical terminology and in several 
arenas outside the medical: in a patriarchal and controlling general culture, in family 
dynamics, and in counselling and mutual-help groups. Three issues are looked at in 
some detail: the role of women’s liberation in allowing more expressive and 
personalised grief talk, the suppression of grief talk in the cause of retaining 
emotional equilibrium within the family, and the exclusion by mutual help-groups of 
some accounts even as they include others. Resistance is directed as much to face-to-
face policing in families and other groups as to grief’s medicalisation. 
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Grief Narratives: the role of medicine in the contemporary policing of grief 
 
I start with two observations. One is the twentieth century medicalisation of grief. 
Lindemann (1944), in a frequently cited article, wrote of the ‘symptomatology and 
management’ of grief, while Engel (1960) argued that grief shares many of the 
characteristics of a depressive illness, and therefore is a proper subject for study by 
medical science, this being as true of uncomplicated as of complicated grief. These 
two authors were psychiatrists, as have been most of the originators of the major 
theories of grief: Sigmund Freud (1984), John Bowlby (1969-80), Elizabeth Kübler-
Ross (1970),i Colin Murray Parkes (1972), and Beverly Raphael (1984). Medical 
ideas include being healed of grief, and a healthy outcome to bereavement. The 
tearing away of the beloved is portrayed as leaving a scar, which will be healed once 
the dead are relocated in memory; eventually grief, like a wound, heals, a recovery is 
made, and the threads of life can be picked up once more. Some wounds heal of their 
own accord; others need medical assistance. 
 Even though Parkes is on record as saying that grief is not a mental illness 
(1994: 17) and even though psychiatry has perhaps not fully recognised the 
contribution of those of its members who have specialised in this area, the fact 
remains that psychiatric theories and research conducted by psychiatrists dominate 
scholarly writings on grief and frequently find their way into popular literature on the 
subject. Further, bereaved people in the UK are more likely, by a long way, to consult 
their family doctor than any other professional. More recently, the natural death 
movement (Albery et al. 1993; Walter 1995) has attempted to demedicalise all aspects 
of death, not least grief, asserting that death, like birth, is a normal and natural 
occurrence of the life cycle. In this vein, a number of articles and courses on 
bereavement and articles now start with a ritual critique of grief’s medicalisation (e.g. 
Wolfelt 1998). 
 My second observation is that a vogue has developed in the last third of the 
twentieth century for bereaved people, at least in the English speaking world, to tell 
their story. Both the demand and the opportunities for this have increased 
significantly. Counselling organisations such as the UK’s Cruse-Bereavement Care 
(founded 1959) and the USA’s Widow-to-Widow programme (founded 1967), and 
self-help groups such as The Compassionate Friends (for parents who have lost a 
child, founded 1969, and operating on both sides of the Atlantic), attract significant 
and increasing numbers. A number of organisations now exist which encourage 
children to speak, paint or model in clay their grief, and fictional stories of grief for 
children are regularly published (Greenall 1988). The number of autobiographical 
books and articles in magazines and newspapers in which bereaved people tell their 
story has also expanded (Holloway 1990). Journalists (Ironside 1996), mountaineers 
(Ballard 1996) and other public figures produce books, articles, radio and television 
programmes documenting their journey through grief. If in the mid-twentieth century, 
grief was supposed to be private (Gorer 1965) or hidden (Ariès 1974), by the end of 
the century a number of (mainly educated female) mourners were going very public 
about their story. 
 Are these two phenomena - medicalisation and the increase in mourners 
telling their story - connected? Arthur Frank’s The Wounded Storyteller (1995) 
prompts the hypothesis that they may be. Frank contrasts modern illness in which the 
medical story is privileged with the postmodern experience of illness which ‘begins 
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when ill people recognize that more is involved in their experience than the medical 
story can tell... Postmodern times are when the capacity for telling one’s own story is 
reclaimed.’ (1995: 6-7) Frank’s heroic postmoderns are reclaiming the experience of 
their own bodies from medical domination. Is something similar happening in the 
current proliferation of lay accounts of grief? Can this proliferation be explained as an 
attempt by mourners to reclaim from doctors the right to describe their own grief? 
This is the hypothesis to be examined in this article.  
 The data on which I draw are primarily sociological studies of bereavement in 
contemporary Britain and the USA, and published personal accounts of grief. These 
are supplemented by my own observations in Britain in the 1990s, including the 
responses of participants in workshops on bereavement I conducted 1997-9 and letters 
sent to me by bereaved people in response to a published article on social barriers to 
talking about the dead (Walter 1996). I will begin by discussing briefly the extent of 
grief’s medicalisation, and then look in more detail at the various ‘policing’ activities 
against which contemporary first-person grief narratives appear to be a protest. The 
conclusion will discuss the extent to which this is a protest against medicalisation. 
 
LIMITS TO MEDICALISATION  
There are obvious grounds for caution in jumping to the conclusion that lay narratives 
are a protest against grief’s medicalisation. First, although bereaved people in Britain 
and many other western countries are more likely to consult a doctor than any other 
professional, their motives and their interaction with the doctor have not been 
researched. It seems to me unlikely, however, that they routinely consult the doctor in 
order to find a cure for grief. If ill people often think ‘I’m ill, I must see the doctor’, 
mourners do not automatically think ‘I’m bereaved, I must see the doctor.’ They need 
a doctor neither to diagnose grief nor to prescribe a cure; rather, as with any loss such 
as divorce or redundancy or indeed any external stressor, it is likely that they visit the 
doctor for medication to help with associated health problems such as sleeplessness or 
depression. 
 Second, unlike many physical and mental complaints, medical interest in grief 
goes back not centuries, still less millennia, but only a few decades. Though Freud’s 
seminal essay was published in 1917, it is only in the last thirty years that psychiatric 
theories of grief have been widely disseminated or that bereavement has been 
included in the general medical curriculum in the UK and the USA (Field 1984). 
 Third, psychiatrist Parkes (1994: 18) is not alone in maintaining that grief is 
not a mental illness and that the aim is not, contra most illnesses, to return the 
mourner as far as possible to the status quo ante. Rather, he describes grief as ‘much 
more like a process through you go, in the course of which you change .... a psycho-
social transition’ (1994: 19). The concept of ‘the grief process’ flows from this idea, 
implying unpredictability and dependence on the particular circumstances of the 
individual. As used by a number of theorists and bereaved people, however, it implies 
a single, predictable process through which all mourners must go and through which 
experts or other bereaved people can help you. Either way, it implies a psychological 
rather a strictly medical phenomenon. We might therefore term ‘the grief process’ a 
semi-psychiatric concept. ii
 If the first three grounds for caution indicate the medicalisation of grief to be 
far from total, the next indicates that many (by no means all) mourners who wish to 
tell their own unfettered story now often enthusiastically use, rather than reject, semi-
 4
psychiatric language. Particularly popular are the notion of grief having stages 
(deriving from Kübler-Ross 1970), the Freudian notion of denial (also part of the 
Kübler-Ross schema), and the notions of ‘the grief process’, the resolution of grief, 
and recovery from grief. (For a brief account of the way these concepts can structure 
popular accounts of grief in the UK, see Walter [1994: Ch. 5], and in the USA, 
Wambach [1985].) In a rare, and hence valuable, participant observation study of a 
widows’ self-help group in Arizona, Wambach (1985) found that teaching new 
members about the stages of grief was one of the main functions of the group, 
although members varied as to how they saw the rigidity and timetabling of these 
stages. ‘The grief process’ and ‘the stages of grief’ were for them a fact, not a 
construct used by researchers, practitioners and mourners to make some sense of 
grief’s complex and ever-changing emotions. In a popular culture where child 
development and other life cycle events are measured according to the norms of 
developmental psychology, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of mourners also 
embrace developmental stage theories which provide guidance and assurance as to 
how they are getting on. In so far as this occurs, we might go so far as to suggest that 
the anomie and lack of guidance left behind by the loss of Victorian social mourning 
has for these mourners been filled by the stages and schedules of ‘the grief process’ as 
identified in psychiatric lore. For them, grief is ordered by the dictates not of social 
mourning but of an inner psychological process. 
 Jalland (1996: 12) found that the material written by and for upper class 
Victorian mourners offered four primary sources of consolation: first and foremost, a 
religious belief in a happy family reunion, followed by the healing power of time, 
private and shared memory, and the sympathy of friends and relatives. An American 
study of late twentieth century literature on maternal grief, however, found three very 
different kinds of comfort to be prominent: stories of other people’s loss, information 
about the stages of grief, and affirmation that the emotions of grief are normal 
(Simonds and Rothman 1992: 158). These three comforts are also provided in a wide 
range of late twentieth century British pamphlets, booklets and popular books for the 
bereaved. Listening to other mourners’ stories and finding out about the semi-
psychiatric stages of grief are therefore not necessarily in conflict and may be 
indulged in by the same reader (Walter 1994: 126-8). Indeed, psychological models 
that identify the mourner’s grief with that of others ‘construct an imaginary wider 
community of like minded individuals amongst whom the bereaved person can feel at 
home, symbolically aligning his or her biography with that of other members of the 
imagined community of the bereaved, who ultimately rejoin the world of the living.’ 
(Seale 1998: 198, see also Anderson 1991) 
 But semi-psychiatric terminology can also be rejected. Holloway (1990: 23) 
describes the response of one of her clients to the books she was recommended to 
read:  
She jumped at the chance to read books by other women who had been 
through similar grief, and she read three books which she said put into words 
much of what she had been feeling. One book which I gave her to read, which 
was more of an analytical description of bereavement, she claimed to have 
been no help whatsoever.... She raced to the end of the Jill Truman book to see 
how she was coping with her grief when years rather than months had elapsed, 
hoping to receive some encouragement that the passage of time would dull the 
pain. 
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This reader wanted some idea of grief’s timetable, but wanted to learn about it from 
personal narrative rather than from theory.  
 A number of mourners (especially those in self-help groups - see below) reject 
stage theories. It is remarkable how many do so on the grounds that their own grief 
has not progressed in a simple unilinear path - they seem unaware that all the leading 
stage theorists agree with them on this! As one white, working class mother said:  
I’ve read all that stages of grief stuff. I’ve read everything on death and dying. 
I can relate to what they say but none of it is me. Mothers don’t get over their 
grief. They don’t do it in stages. You just cross over and go back. It’s like a 
circle, when you go round it once, you go back round it again. You do your 
own thing. (Quoted in Cline 1996: 193) 
Mourners such as this may have been sold a bowdlerised, overly linear version of 
stage theory by an intermediary (an article in a woman’s magazine, a doctor, a college 
tutor, or another bereaved person);iii or they may themselves have read an account of 
stage theory which does highlight the lack of any simple progression, but at the time 
the reader was so desperate for clear guidelines that they read simple progression into 
the text when none was there. The map they thus created in their minds was 
subsequently disconfirmed by their own experience.  
 We may conclude from this brief discussion that some mourners resist 
psychiatric theorising about grief, but some others tie concepts deriving from such 
theories into highly personal first-person accounts and even use them to structure 
those accounts. Contemporary bereavement literature is, as I will show in the rest of 
the article, permeated by the need of many to tell their story in the face of others who 
cannot or will not hear them, but those who police and prohibit such first-person 
stories are not necessarily, or even primarily, those using semi-psychiatric concepts. 
 
POLICING GRIEF
In every society, the expression of grief is regulated by conventions and rituals which 
indicate how, and how much, mourners should speak about the dead and express their 
feelings. In this sense, grief has always been policed. iv
 Though historians and anthropologists have documented these conventions in 
a number of societies, they have not always recorded the extent such conventions are 
appreciated by mourners; there has perhaps been a tendency for anthropologists (less 
so for historians) simply to assume the rules of mourning to be socially and 
psychologically functional. We do know that by the end of the nineteenth century 
upper middle class Victorian women in Britain were beginning to resent the 
restrictions of formal mourning, a resentment fuelled at least in part by their growing 
desire for personal freedom and privacy (Morley 1971; Cannadine 1981; Taylor 
1983). These twin themes of freedom and privacy in mourning, and the consequent 
collapse of socially required mourning, spread to other social classes in the first half 
of the twentieth century (Walter 1999: Chapter 8). By the end of the twentieth 
century, the term ‘the grief police’ has become a term of abuse for any who would 
presume to tell others how, or for whom, to grieve. In the widespread popular and 
journalistic scepticism about the expansion of counselling in Britain in the late 1990s, 
counsellors are particularly vilified as members of this unwanted police force; a 
hospice worker, for example, wrote to me in 1996 that on the death of his wife he was 
advised by his daughter ‘Don’t let the grief police get at you’. After the death of 
Diana, Princess of Wales in 1997, by no means everyone wanted to join in the 
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massive (and massively publicised) public mourning; Jack (1997: 18), for example, 
complained of ‘a kind of floral fascism . . . a country patrolled by the grief police’. 
 If all known societies regulate grief through the policing activities of 
community, family and religion, the late twentieth century has witnessed a 
widespread opinion that such policing is illegitimate. I hope to document in this 
second half of the article that the demand of many contemporary bereaved people to 
tell their own story is made in the face of what they perceive as undue policing. I 
suspect their demand is fuelled less by the objective amount of such policing (which 
may be historically at a rather low level) than by the perceived illegitimacy of any 
such regulation. I will start by examining the most general level of culture, before 
progressively focusing on policing by families, by counsellors, and by self-help 
groups of ever-increasing specialisation. 
 
Culture and gender.  
Since mourners can become emotional when telling their story, whether others want 
to listen to them depends in part on whether the culture allows the expression of 
emotion (Rosenblatt et al. 1976). Mourners may want to speak of the dead (Walter 
1996), but whether the dead may be included in everyday conversation depends on 
cultural norms. During the seven days of the Jewish shiva, for example, mourners are 
expected to discuss the deceased; but the North American Apache are not allowed to 
speak the name of the dead, while the Hopi express no desire to recall the memory of 
their deceased (Mandelbaum 1959). If the dead may be mentioned or addressed, there 
are likely to be rules as to how they may be included in conversation. In 
contemporary Britain there are such rules, though not total agreement over them. 
Some people consider one should not speak ill of the dead and many are unwilling to 
mention the dead if they think it will cause upset; yet at the same time, there is also a 
trend toward funerals in which the minister or officiant speaks about the dead person, 
and a sensitive truthfulness in such speech is appreciated by mourners. 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, grief was identified as a properly feminine 
condition. Simonds and Rothman (1992: ch.1) argue, I think correctly, that this was 
part of the feminisation of family life, of the emotions and of religion that occurred in 
North America and Britain at that time and that has continued well into the middle of 
the twentieth century. Women were believed to be - and in large measure were - more 
pious, family-oriented, emotional and prone to grief than were men. This led to very 
different expectations being laid on grieving males and females, men being expected 
to get back to work and master their grief (Jalland 1996), women (or at least those 
genteel women with the required leisure) being expected to give way to it during an 
officially imposed period of mourning within the privacy of the home. The late 
twentieth century, however, has seen a colossal march of women out of the home and 
into jobs and careers, not least into journalism and the mass media where their voice 
is now heard. And among many other things, women are talking publicly about how 
they grieve. The private is once more becoming public. So the grief we are hearing 
about nowadays is the grief of upper-middle class, educated women. Women telling 
their story of grief is part of the wider trend toward women telling their story, of 
whatever kind. It is part of a rejection of a patriarchal culture which would hide 
women’s experiences and stories from public view. v
 It is also a rejection of a culture of emotional containment and control. The 
desire of some bereaved people to be more expressive with their emotions is part of a 
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wider cultural trend. Ralph Turner (1976) perceives a shift from defining the self in 
terms of commitment to institutional roles, to the self as an expression of impulses or 
feelings. Bernice Martin (1981) writing in the UK, like Robert Bellah et al. (1985) in 
the USA, identifies two kinds of individualism that profoundly shape the 
contemporary world: a meritocratic / instrumental / utilitarian version, and a romantic 
/ expressive version. The former is strong in the commercial middle classes, 
engineering, politics and science, the latter among the professions, arts and social 
sciences, and among women, and is in the ascendancy. 
 Seale (1995) has documented a shift in the script for heroic dying, from one in 
which the person and their intimates display courage through stoicism and hiding 
their feelings to one in which they show courage through being aware and expressive 
(see also Hawkins 1990). This new script, he argues, is ‘particularly suited to the 
conditions of late modernity, where the project of self-awareness is a central pre-
occupation.’ (Seale 1995: 610-11) Contemporary mourners are offered the possibility 
of a comparably heroic grief. The heroic mourner finds the courage to explore and 
express her painful feelings, reflexively monitors her progress (cf Giddens 1991) 
along a path of pilgrimage well-worn by the feet of countless other pilgrims and, 
fortified by their tales, eventually arrives at the goal of healing and resolution, from 
which she can return safely to everyday life, a changed woman who has grown 
through the experience. And once returned, like many a true pilgrim, she regales 
others on the way with her adventures. 
 Whether they are breaking free from patriarchal censorship or from a more 
general culture of emotional containment, it is professional females who are the most 
likely to wish, and/or have the opportunity, to tell their stories of grief. Other reasons 
that women are more likely than men to tell their grief story are that there are many 
more widows than widowers, and that the mother-child bond is often particularly 
intense, causing women who lose either their own mother vi or a young child to feel 
more grief than do many (but by no means all) men (Walter 1999: ch.10).  
 The women’s stories typically come across as both intensely personal and (if 
their hearers and readers identify) as somehow universal. They are not presented as 
specific to a gender, a culture, a time. So I as the bereaved hearer/reader either 
identify and feel relieved that someone has, on my behalf, articulated my feelings and 
at least part of my story; or I feel their story is not my story. One general practitioner 
in a working-class London practice mentioned to me that the typical published 
complaint of the widow not being asked out by friends since she no longer has a 
partner rings no bells with her patients because in their working-class culture women 
go out, if at all, with other women and not with their husbands. We will see more 
below of how first person accounts serve both to include and exclude, the excluded 
often feeling driven to tell in turn their story. It is not just medical accounts that 
exclude. 
 
Families  
According to the evidence in published bereavement autobiographies and in 
qualitative research material, the culture of containment is mediated primarily through 
other family members, through family norms and family dynamics. The main police 
officers of grief are other family members.  
 In the following quote, the policing was concerned to enforce a reasonable 
period of mourning: 
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My family were very nice for about six weeks - very understanding but I was 
terrible for months afterwards, I used to forget things - I was living in another 
world, it takes me a long time to get over things. Anyway in the end they just 
lost patience. My husband was really nasty about it, he said: ‘For God’s sake 
woman, what’s the matter with you, I was never like that when my mother 
died - it’s been months.’ (Littlewood 1992: 87) 
The notion that grief is best limited to a certain period of time characterises formal 
mourning periods in traditional societies, and has been legitimated by Geoffrey Gorer 
(1965) as psychologically healthy - though the period he specified is rather longer 
than that expected in many British and American households. Without a formally 
specified time, there may be little or no agreement as to what is appropriate. While 
many bereaved people value the support given, after a time, to re-engage in social 
activities or to take up paid work, 40 per cent of those Littlewood interviewed felt the 
withdrawal of emotional support to be premature. 
 In many accounts of the death of a child, the parents - because of gender 
differences or because of coming from families of origin with different coping styles - 
may grieve in different, often mutually incomprehensible, ways (Riches & Dawson 
1997). He may keep his thoughts to himself, going off fishing for hours by himself or 
going to smoke a cigarette by the child’s grave on his way to work; she may want to 
talk, and talk, and talk. Each thinks the other is not coping well.  
 Children and parents may not be able to handle the other telling their story, or 
preventing them from telling it. Laura Prince (1996) wrote an autobiography twenty 
five years after the accidental death of her thirteen year old brother. Laura had been 
sixteen at the time, and became increasingly aware of the consequences of the death 
of Mathew, who had been the one who held the family together. Why did she write 
the book? Because after his death the family never talked about Mathew or shared 
their feelings about his death; Prince wanted to break the silence, to tell her story and 
to tell Mathew’s story. Her book, Breaking the Silence, implies that her family’s 
silence about bereavement symbolises that of American society in general.vii
 Starting in the Victorian period and persisting through to the middle of the 
twentieth century, adults have protected children from the dangers of the adult world 
by keeping them in ignorance, thus maintaining their innocence (de Mause 1976; 
James & Prout 1990). Recent decades, however, have seen a trend away from this, 
with experts urging parents and teachers to protect children by informing them, most 
notably with regard to sex, sexual diseases and drugs (Sommerville 1982; Scraton 
1996). To what extent parents have actually made this shift is not entirely clear. A 
significant concern of contemporary death education, represented in books such as 
Prince’s, is that children grieve too and that adults should recognise this; children are 
not protected from grief by adults not talking about it in their presence. Just as it is 
dangerous to think that children are not in contact with the world of drugs, so - it is 
now argued - it is dangerous to think that they are not deeply affected when someone 
close to them dies. (Clark 1998) 
 Parents who inform their eight year olds about sex and drugs may 
nevertheless balk at sharing their grief with them, or eliciting their child’s own grief. 
It may simply be too much for either party. The prematurely bereaved American 
widows studied by Silverman in the late 1960s complained that friends and family 
steered conversation away from the deceased because they did not want to upset, or 
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be upset by, the widow, yet many widows did precisely the same thing to their own 
children: 
the needs of the children could not wait while the widow dealt with her own 
grief, yet her own grief interfered with her ability to be aware of their needs 
and at times prevented her from responding appropriately.... Children were 
open about their grief, and many widows had difficulty with this. One 
woman compared her children’s questions to ‘a knife being stuck in my 
throat’. At the same time, they did not want to burden their children with 
their own grief, and they would withdraw, inadvertently causing the children 
to lose both parents..... The widows rationalised that the children would be 
unduly upset by seeing their grief, and they tried to keep themselves from 
crying in front of the children..... The children responded to their mother’s 
lead..... In another family, the widow reported that her daughters stopped 
talking about their father when they saw how upset she became. (Silverman 
1986: 93-6) 
People cannot cope with too much pain, so avoid painful conversations. Just as 
bereaved fathers can shut themselves off from their wives, so widows can shut 
themselves off from their children - with the same effect: the wife loses her husband 
as well as her child, the children lose their mother as well as their father. It can also 
work the other way around, with children shutting up their parents. After the death of 
his wife, C.S. Lewis recorded (1961: 11): ‘I cannot talk to the children about her. The 
moment I try, there appears on their faces neither grief, nor love, nor fear, nor pity but 
the most fatal of all non-conductors, embarrassment.’  
 Shapiro (1994: 12) argues that families need a modicum of emotional 
equilibrium in order to function, and re-establishing this is necessary in the aftermath 
of a bereavement. But the loss of access to shared grief that this may entail, and the 
loss of both individual and family stories about both the death and the dead, may be 
acutely felt. In such families, given the increasing value that contemporary British 
media place on expressing emotions, it is not surprising if some mourners also believe 
emotional expression to be vital for psychological health and become desperate to 
find someone who will hear their story and/or accept their feelings. 
 If family norms and dynamics are a major reason why some mourners are not 
allowed to tell their story, another is that others who knew the deceased are physically 
not there, at least not on a day-to-day basis (Walter 1996). Prior to the twentieth 
century, the most common deaths were of children and of parents before the children 
had left home, so the chief mourners - parent(s) and other siblings - were typically 
still living under the same roof. With the vast reduction in child mortality, with most 
adults living long past the time when their (smaller) families have left home, with the 
geographical mobility of those who have left home, and with the separation of home 
and work, the typical mourner today is grieving an elderly spouse or parent, and does 
not see the other main mourners on a day-to-day basis. The elderly widow lives on 
her own; middle aged children are surrounded by neighbours and workmates who 
never met their mother; likewise the grandfather whose favourite grandson is killed in 
a traffic accident. Friends, colleagues and neighbours are likely to have a low 
threshold for listening to the story of one they never knew.  
 
Counselling  
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If friends, neighbours and family are either unable or unwilling to hear the mourner’s 
story, it is perhaps not surprising if increasing numbers are going to a professional 
stranger - a bereavement counsellor - who is willing to listen to the story and able to 
hold the emotion. Clients often speak of their relief at being able to talk and to weep 
without fear of judgement. Hoffman (1988) suggests that the role of therapists (not 
just grief therapists) is that of a friendly editor, helping clients re-write their self. 
Jennifer Hockey, an anthropologist who trained as a Cruse counsellor, observes that 
In describing their experience of grief, bereaved people are subjecting their 
own intense, inchoate emotion and their extensive personal memories to a 
process of selection and ordering. What emerges are external verbal forms 
which the counsellor in turn seeks to edit or clarify. The product is an account, 
existing outside of themselves, which the bereaved person then submits to 
further processes of interpretation. 
(Hockey 1986: 334) 
Although few bereavement counsellors in the UK have been trained to see their work 
as narrative therapy, a large proportion of the many I have encountered in training 
workshops recognise that one of their functions is to provide a space where the client 
can talk about the deceased and tell his or her story. 
 Gender is again significant. Cruse is the UK’s biggest voluntary agency for 
bereaved people, concentrating by the 1990s on volunteer counselling. In 1997-8, 76 
per cent of Cruse’s 26,000 clients and 86 per cent of its 4,500 volunteers were female. 
The stories of grief that emerge in Cruse counselling are typically women’s stories, 
edited by women. It is unclear whether men do not join Cruse (either as volunteers or 
as clients) because they grieve less, or because they cannot identify with the female 
way of telling stories and with the emotional disclosure that often goes with this (cf 
Schut et al 1997). 
 Sometimes counselling fails to help clients edit their account in ways they find 
appropriate. This leads me now to discuss self-help groups in which the mourner joins 
a face-to-face community of people she hopes have experienced what she has 
experienced. 
 
Mutual-help Groups  
Self-help bereavement groups are better termed mutual help groups (MHGs), in that 
they teach not self-reliance but the value of sharing stories and feelings with others 
who have suffered the same category of loss. MHGs typically reject popular culture 
with its norms of emotional control, getting over grief in a matter of weeks, and 
‘letting go’ of the deceased. MHGs typically also reject counselling and the semi-
psychiatric discourse of stages and resolution, of normal and abnormal grief. One 
could even go so far as to say that MHG members define their group precisely in 
terms of its rejection of these two bodies of knowledge. Stories abound in MHGs of 
uncomprehending friends, relatives and professionals who have not ‘been there’, that 
is, who have not themselves lost a child, or a sibling, or whatever category of loss 
permits entry to the group (Riches & Dawson 1996). A leading figure in the 
Lockerbie support group, whose son died on the crashed plane, told me how useless 
counsellors were, and how much better it was to talk to other Lockerbie people. Rock 
(1998: 143) describes how one speaker told a meeting of Support After Murder and 
Manslaughter, to murmurs of agreement: ‘I was a bereavement counsellor, but until 
you’ve lost a child yourself, you know nothing!’  
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 This self-definition of the group as non- or even anti-professional 
characterises not just those MHGs concerned with bereavement: 
Implicit in the self-help thrust is a profound critique of professionalism... 
Traditionally, the professions have been characterized by (1) control of entry 
into the occupation; (2) colleague rather than client orientation in terms of 
standards; (3) an occupational code of ethics; and (4) a ‘scientific-theoretical’ 
basis for occupational activity... The entire ethos of the professional 
orientation is very different from the self-help orientation which is much more 
activistic, consumer centred, informal, open, and inexpensive. 
(Gartner & Reissman 1977: 12-14) 
MHGs rely on experiential rather than professional knowledge or academic research 
as the way to truth, and the most valued MHG members are those who can use their 
own experience to handle their own or others’ problems (Borkman 1976; Klass 1988: 
186).  
 Studies of  bereavement MHGs, such as those by Klass (1988), Riches and 
Dawson (1996) and Rock (1998), concur that  the communion experienced among 
those who have been through the same experience of loss can be powerful. The 
experience, for example, of losing a child has in the twentieth century become one 
that isolates a parent from other parents, and to join with others who have also lost a 
child can create an almost overwhelming sense of fusion. Here, at last, are people who 
understand, who know what it is like, who have experienced what I have experienced. 
In the group, experiential understanding has authority over abstract expertise or well-
meaning but uncomprehending sympathy.  
 Not all bereaved parents, however, have had the same experience.
 Those who have lost an adult child have different experiences from those 
who have lost younger children, and may even experience ageism from these younger 
parents. Jeanne Webster Blank (1998) lost her 39-year-old daughter to breast cancer. 
She researched and wrote her book about the grief of older parents because she felt 
isolated not only from her contemporaries who had not suffered such a misfortune, 
but also from the bereaved parents in the local chapter of The Compassionate Friends, 
most of whom had lost a baby or younger child. ‘I found myself longing for someone 
whose experience coincided with mine, with whom I could compare my feelings and 
responses - someone who was not a grieving mother a decade younger than my 
Cathy.’ (1998: 3) So she sent a nation-wide questionnaire to other TCF members who 
had lost an adult child; the sixty replies comforted her that she was not so abnormal in 
the length and severity of her grief. Their stories were not being told in the TCF 
chapters up and down the USA. (Interestingly, only 10 per cent of her respondents 
were fathers, suggesting that fathers’ stories have still to be told, or perhaps that they 
do not want them told?) 
 A perceptive analysis of how the fusion experienced by some members of a 
bereaved parents MHG may leave others out in the cold, leading to fission as they set 
up their own new group, is found in Rock’s (1998) detailed analysis of British MHGs 
for parents who have lost a child through homicide. TCF was formed in 1969 for all 
who had lost a child. By the 1980s, TCF was attracting some who had lost a child by 
murder, but they found themselves alienated from other TCF members. Their 
passionate hate for the murderer, equally passionate dismay at the criminal (in)justice 
system, and difficulty in extracting information from this system about exactly how 
their child died, were not shared by other bereaved parents. Parents of murdered 
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children could not empathise with the stories of those parents whose child had died of 
leukaemia, stories in which the child slipped peacefully away surrounded by family 
and attended by caring professionals. It was the emotion of hate more than any other 
than bound these parents together and isolated them from other bereaved parents. 
Parents of murdered children also find their own and their child’s identity spoiled 
(Riches & Dawson 1998) - what was a thirteen year old doing out so late? why didn’t 
you know where she was? These are the questions that the defence counsel asks in 
full view of the court and that they fear other parents are asking behind their backs. 
Nor did the parents of murdered children always find the volunteer helpers from 
Victim Support of much use: not victims themselves, their training equipped them to 
counsel those who had suffered property crimes but were hopelessly at sea with one 
whose child had been murdered. So POMC (Parents of Murdered Children) was 
formed as an offshoot of TCF, eventually becoming independent and re-forming as 
SAMM (Support After Murder and Manslaughter). These and related groups turned 
increasingly to campaigning for changes in a legal system that ignores them, making 
them into victims twice over: once at the hand of the murderer, and once at the hands 
of the judicial process. 
 But the process of fusion and fission did not stop there. Most murders are 
committed not by strangers, but by those who know the victim, and may even be close 
relatives. The black-and-white world of POMC could not handle the grey world of 
those grieving a child whose murderer was no vile stranger but a son or brother whom 
they were regularly visiting in prison and to whom they would remain emotionally 
attached for life. Aftermath was formed in 1988 as an MHG for ‘the families of the 
serious offender’ and includes a number where there is intra-family murder.  
 Bereavement MHGs are like Russian dolls, each nested within a slightly 
bigger one. The biggest doll is the community of the bereaved, with every appearance 
of unity and coherence, all going through ‘the grief process’. But inside it is the 
smaller community of bereaved parents, with every appearance of unity and 
coherence. But inside it is the smaller community of parents who have lost a child 
through murder. And inside that is the even smaller community of parents who have 
lost a child through murder at the hands of a stranger. The creation of each doll is the 
work of those who fuse with others who have the same story, but each fusion 
excludes and hides a sub-group, who may (or may not) fuse to create their own, 
smaller, doll.  
 Another possible image is of the postmodern mourner as a nomad (Bauman 
1992), wandering here and there until she finds someone who will hear her story. This 
image, however, is almost certainly misleading. Few mourners have the stamina to 
search consistently. It is usually a matter of chance which group or groups they 
encounter; if the story fits, all well and good. If the story does not fit, they are more 
likely to return to isolation, or move on to, at most, one other group.  
 
CONCLUSION   
There is a danger in social science in confusing the attempt by medicine to colonise 
an area of human experience with successful colonisation. Certainly in some cases the 
colonisation is effective, as with childbirth where virtually all pregnant women 
routinely consult medical clinics and where most births take place within hospital. 
But in other areas, the colonisation is very far from complete. Just because 
homosexuality was medically identified (before its legalisation) as a psychiatric 
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abnormality does not mean that most homosexuals were terrified of being 
incarcerated in a psychiatric institution; stigma at the hands of friends, family and 
employers may have provided much more effective policing of their everyday life. 
This stigma was based more on the belief that homosexuality was disgusting or sinful 
than that it was a sickness. Likewise the contemporary identification of eating 
disorders as psychiatrically treatable is not the main reason that bulimics hide their 
habit: they are more often afraid their parents will think it disgusting or that partners 
will abandon them. viii So too with grief: it seems that grief’s medicalisation is just 
one, and by no means the most powerful, way in which mourners are policed.  
 Clearly, there is an extent to which grief has been medicalised. This is evident 
in the psychiatric basis of many theories about grief, in the diffusion of semi-
psychiatric terms into the everyday language of mourning, and in the relatively high 
proportion of mourners who visit their family doctor for medication or in the hope of 
having someone to talk to. It is also clear that the strong drive of mourners to tell their 
own story, unedited and unpoliced by others, is in part driven by resistance to the 
semi-psychiatric terminology of ‘resolution’, ‘stages’ and ‘denial’ that pervades a 
significant proportion of the professional and volunteer help on offer. This is 
particularly true of the anti-professional rhetoric of mutual help groups. But it is 
equally clear that the urge ‘to tell my story’ is driven by resistance to a range of other 
policing activities. Family dynamics, the experience of other bereaved people, and a 
general culture of containment can all be experienced as invalidating and/or silencing 
my own story. Face-to-face policing by those met daily in everyday life has an 
immedicacy that differentiates it from policing by the abstract concepts introduced 
into mourning by psychiatry. Resistance to medicalization thus constitutes only a part 
of the struggle of mourners to find a voice.  
 Indeed, the culture of expressivism that encourages mourners to go public 
with their emotions and their stories derives in part from Freudian and other 
psychiatric and semi-psychiatric theories which praise the healing value of emotional 
disclosure. At this point, Arney and Bergen (1984) and Armstrong (1987) rather than 
Frank (1995) are nearer the mark. The patient’s story is not so much a heroic 
resistance to medicalisation; rather, medics themselves have encouraged patients to be 
more open about their inner secrets, and nowhere more successfully than with dying 
patients. There certainly is an element of this in the relationship between psychiatric 
theories of grief and mourners’ demands to tell their story.  
 In all this, of course, many mourners wish to continue to grieve in private, to 
keep their stories and their memories to themselves (Walter 1999: ch.8). They are 
disturbed by the trend away from a culture of containment in which mourners are 
censured for telling their story toward an expressive culture in which mourners are 
encouraged to tell their story and censured for ‘bottling up their feelings’. 
Expressivism is making a bold challenge to the culture of containment, but not 
without resistance (e.g. Anderson and Mullen 1998). Whether expressivism will 
succeed in becoming the dominant culture, with all that will mean for storytelling, 
only time will tell. The other (more tolerant, perhaps postmodern?) possibility is that 
mourners really will be left free to grieve their own way, to talk if they want to, to 
maintain their privacy if they want to. But there is no historical precedent for such a 
society, and the data I have presented on family dynamics and on the dynamics of 
mutual help groups suggest that human groups will always develop norms for how 
grief may, or may not, be talked about, and these norms will always be policed.  
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 Bauman (1997) argues that traditional societies, and to an extent modern ones 
too, provide security at the expense of personal liberty; postmodernity, by contrast, 
celebrates difference and personal freedom at the expense of security. His analysis 
certainly fits the phenomenon of mourning. Traditional societies typically police 
mourning through religious and community-enforced norms. Modernity, with its 
ideals of personal liberty, especially for women, undermined these norms but to some 
extent replaced them with expert psychiatric definitions of healthy grieving which 
likewise provide a map of the convoluted terrain of grief. In postmodern times, both 
the old and the new maps are challenged by those who claim no maps can be made of 
a land that is entirely subjective and individual (Stroebe et al 1992). And indeed, 
contemporary American and British mourners probably have more freedom to grieve 
as they will than has been the case in any known society; it is this taste of freedom 
that causes some to resent so bitterly the policing of their grief. Yet the evidence 
presented in this article also suggests that the desire (of both mourners and their 
comforters) for security, for a map, for fellow travellers, for rules that must be 
policed, is sufficiently strong that most mourners will never be allowed to be entirely 
free spirits. Modernist medicine is but one section of the force that polices, and will 
continue to police, them. 
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i Her major work concerns the dying, but her stage theory has been very influential in 
subsequent thinking about bereavement. 
ii I draw the term ‘semi-psychiatric’ from Perakyla (1988).  
 
iii For an example, written by a family doctor in the popular UK magazine Radio 
Times, see Porter (1996). 
 
iv The source of my concept of policing is Durkheim’s notion of the need of society to 
regulate the passions (1952). Links could also, of course, be made with the work of 
Foucault (e.g. 1973). 
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v The discovery in the 1990s of ‘the emotional male’ means that men’s stories of grief 
are now also being told. 
 
vi Women losing a parent is the second largest category of client that Cruse currently 
works with, almost replacing the widow as the typical client (Cruse national statistics, 
1997-8). The loss of a child-minding grandparent may represent for increasing 
numbers of working mothers a practical and financial, as well as personal, loss. 
 
vii It is unclear to what extent Prince had felt the family prevented her talking about 
Mathew at the time. Most of the insights in the book date from after she entered 
therapy, so this is the account that emerged in the therapy room, a room to which the 
other family members were never admitted, and therefore it carries all the problems of 
retrospective recall of emotional abuse. 
viii See ongoing doctoral work by Dawn Clarke, Dept of Sociology, University of 
Reading. 
